Supreme Court Term 2023-2024

Whether a U.S. citizen gets a day in court to challenge the federal government’s revocation of her spouse’s immigrant visa.

In Tabler v. Lumpkin, the ACLU represents a Texas death row prisoner whose lawyers refused to represent him at a hearing to determine his capacity to decide whether to give up his state post-conviction appeals, leaving him effectively unrepresented at that hearing. Our petition asks the Supreme Court to review Richard Tabler’s case and to hold that when a defendant’s lawyers abandon him, his waiver of further appeals should not bar his access to federal habeas corpus review of the constitutionality of his conviction.

This case in the Oregon Supreme Court centers on whether Article I, Section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that Oregon prisoners lack legally enforceable rights to prison jobs and training, bars prisoners from collecting damages relating to lost prison jobs and training caused by the alleged breach of a settlement agreement by prison officials. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, alongside the ACLU of Oregon, filed an amicus brief arguing that that plaintiff Arnold Huskey, an incarcerated individual whose identity was used in Department of Corrections training materials, is entitled to damages notwithstanding Article I, Section 41(3), because plaintiffs in contract disputes never have to show standalone legal rights to the damages they claim. Instead, they need only show that the damages were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the alleged breach of contract.

This case in the Indiana Supreme Court concerns whether a case is moot when someone is released from a civil commitment while appealing the commitment order. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, alongside the ACLU of Indiana, filed an amicus brief arguing that the appellant’s case is not moot, despite her release from civil commitment, because the Indiana Constitution favors adjudicating appeals by people whose liberty has been curtailed, because it meets a traditional mootness exception for cases that at capable of repetition yet evading review, and because it also meets Indiana’s public interest exception to mootness.